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A number of prior studies have examined audit reporting quality using size (Big 8/6/5/4) as a 
proxy for quality (i.e. Lennox, 1999b; Francis and Krishnan, 1999; Weber and Willenborg, 
2003). In this paper we move beyond the traditional definition of a high quality auditor, and 
investigate whether enhanced industry knowledge or an increased focus on business risk 
auditing methodologies improve audit reporting accuracy. In addition, we examine whether 
industry specialists and business risk auditors have a comparative advantage in judging the 
adequacy of mitigating management actions implemented by financially distressed 
companies. Using a sample of US companies from manufacturing industries (SIC 20-39) that 
went bankrupt between 1998-2001, we do not find evidence supporting that specialist 
auditors are more likely to issue a going concern opinion for companies that subsequently go 
bankrupt. However, our evidence does indicate that specialists are not fooled by operating 
initiatives (whereas non-specialists are). Interestingly and counter to our expectations, we 
find that audit firms using a business risk methodology are less likely to issue a going–
concern opinion for a firm that subsequently goes bankrupt. Further, our evidence also 
suggests that business risk auditors may be ‘fooled’ by short term operating efforts to reduce 
financial distress. Finally, we also find very strong evidence that auditors, irrespective of their 
type, are ‘fooled’ into not issuing a going concern opinion for clients that subsequently go 












I.  INTRODUCTION 
A number of prior studies have examined audit reporting quality using size as a proxy 
for quality, specifically, Big 8/6/5 audit firms have been considered to be higher quality than 
other audit firms, i.e., so-called Big N firms.  Francis and Krishnan (1999) find that Big N 
auditors are more likely to issue modified audit reports for high-accrual firms while Weber 
and Willenborg (2003) report that the pre-IPO audit opinions by large accounting firms are 
more predictive of post-IPO negative stock delistings.  In a similar vein, Lennox (1999b) 
finds that Big 6 auditors issue more accurate audit reports than non-Big 6 firms.  In this 
paper, we contribute to research focusing on the quality of auditor reporting by investigating 
the impact of industry specialisation and audit methodology on audit reporting accuracy. 
Audit firms have changed significantly in the past decade with respect to their structure and 
audit methodology.  Consistent with these changes, we move beyond the ”Big N” view of 
auditor differentiation and investigate other auditor traits that may be associated with 
differential audit reporting accuracy. More specifically, we investigate whether enhanced 
industry knowledge or an increased focus on business risk auditing methodologies improve 
audit reporting accuracy. In addition, we investigate the comparative advantage of industry 
specialists and business risk auditors in judging the adequacy of mitigating management 
actions implemented by financially distressed companies. 
Using a sample of US companies from manufacturing industries (SIC 20-39) that 
went bankrupt between 1998-2001, we do not find evidence supportive of our hypothesis that 
specialist auditors are more likely to issue a going concern opinion for companies that 
subsequently go bankrupt. However, our evidence does indicate that non-specialist auditors 
are ‘fooled’ into not giving a going concern opinion by operating and strategic management 
initiatives undertaken by distressed clients, while auditors that are specialists are not fooled 
by operating initiatives. Interestingly and counter to our expectations, we find that audit firms 
2 using a business risk methodology are less likely to issue a going–concern opinion for a firm 
that subsequently goes bankrupt. We also find that non-business risk auditors do not react to 
the presence of client initiatives to reduce financial distress. However, business risk auditors 
are less likely to issue a going concern opinion to a client that subsequently goes bankrupt if 
the client has undertaken operating initiatives. This suggests that business risk auditors may 
be ‘fooled’ by short term operating efforts to reduce financial distress.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section we discuss 
prior research on auditor reporting quality and develop our hypotheses.  In the third section 
we discuss the approach to modelling we use, including the definition of the variables 
included in the analysis.  In the fourth section, we describe the way in which we constructed 
our sample and report descriptive statistics for our variables.  The fifth section presents our 
multivariate results, followed by a short summary and conclusion. 
 
II. PRIOR RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES 
Although bankruptcy prediction is not the objective of an audit, the auditing 
profession has repeatedly been criticized for not providing early warning signals for 
impending client bankruptcy in the form of going concern modified audit reports 
(Raghunandan and Rama, 1995).  From a financial statement user’s point of view, 
bankruptcies without a prior going concern report are often viewed as audit reporting failures 
(McKeown  et al., 1991; Chen and Church, 1992; Geiger and Ragunandan, 2002).  The 
frequency that audit reports do not alert readers to impending bankruptcy has been 
extensively documented in prior research, which has generally shown that the proportion of 
bankrupt companies that receive a going concern audit opinion in the year immediately 
preceding bankruptcy is less than 50 percent (Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002; Raghunandan 
and Rama, 1995; Chen and Church, 1992).  Prior research that investigated the reasons why 
auditors do not modify audit reports prior to bankruptcy focused on a variety of  auditor and 
3 client attributes such as auditor size, auditor tenure, the probability of bankruptcy, payments 
and covenant defaults, bankruptcy lag, and industry sector (e.g., McKeown et al., 1991; 
Mutchler et al., 1997; Lennox, 1999a and 1999b).  
In the 1990s, large accounting firms started to structure their business around industry 
sectors and began to actively market their industry knowledge (Casterella et al., 2004).  In the 
same time period, many auditors developed new audit methodologies which focused on client 
business risk which emphasized auditors’ knowledge of the client’s business and industry 
(e.g., Bell et al., 1997; Lemon et al., 2000; Knechel, 2001).  However, little is known about 
whether auditor reporting accuracy has been affected by the emphasis on industry 
specialization or the new audit methodologies, although there is ample research concerning 
the links between audit quality and industry specialisation (e.g., O’Keefe et al., 1994; 
Owhoso  et al., 2002; Balsam et al., 2003; Low, 2004).  Furthermore, recent research 
indicates that strategic information about a client can have a significant impact on the 
likelihood that an auditor issues a going concern report (Behn et al., 2001; Geiger and Rama, 
2003, Bruynseels and Willekens, 2006).  The results of these studies raise the question 
whether this information has a positive impact on auditor report accuracy or, to the contrary, 
may be potentially deceptive regarding the true economic conditions of the client.  
Audit reporting accuracy 
Early research by McKeown, Mutchler, and Hopwood (1991)  investigated why 
auditors often fail to modify the opinions of soon-to-be-bankrupt companies, and found that 
the likelihood of these reporting “errors” is larger when the probability of bankruptcy is 
lower, when the reporting lag is shorter, and when the client is larger.  In a later study, 
Mutchler, Hopwood and McKeown (1997) also observed that extreme negative reports about 
a client that appear in the public media prior to an audit report significantly increase the 
likelihood of the client receiving a going concern opinion.  Looking at UK data, Lennox 
4 (1999a) noted that the economic cycle and industry sector are important predictors of 
bankruptcy, although they are not significant in the audit reporting model since auditors seem 
to be reluctant to give first-time qualifications (or to give clean opinions following qualified 
reports).  Of direct interest to our study, Lennox (1999b) reported that the likelihood of an 
auditor not issuing a going concern opinion for a company that subsequently went bankrupt 
(sometimes referred to as Type II error), and the likelihood of the auditor issuing a going 
concern opinion for a company that actually survived (referred to as a Type I error), were 
both smaller for large audit firms when compared to small audit firms.    
Prior research has also investigated the impact of changes in legislation, reporting 
requirements or the auditing environment on auditor reporting behaviour.  Carcello et al. 
(1995) investigated the impact of the issuance of SAS No. 34 and SAS No. 59 on the 
propensity of large firms to issue going concern modified opinions.  They report that audit 
firms were more likely to issue modified reports for subsequently bankrupt firms after the 
issuance of SAS no. 34, but not after the issuance of SAS no. 59.  In contrast, Raghunandan 
and Rama (1995) found that after SAS no. 59 became effective, auditors were more likely to 
issue going concern modified opinions for financially stressed non-bankrupt companies and 
for bankrupt companies prior to failure.  A more recent study of Geiger and Raghunandan 
(2001) examined the potential impact of the Private Securities Reform Act (enacted in 1995) 
which reduced the cost of litigation against auditors.  Their results indicate that auditors were 
less likely to issue going concern modified audit reports for soon-to-be bankrupt companies 
after the Reform Act.
1   
Industry Specialization 
                                                 
1 Another interesting study by Geiger et al. (2005) investigates whether auditors were more conservative in their 
reporting after December 2001 (when the Enron story became public).  They find evidence of a decrease in 
Type II reporting errors in the post-December 2001 period. 
5 A growing body of research investigates the effect of auditor industry specialisation 
on the market for audit services and audit quality and has mainly focused on the relationship 
between industry specialisation and the pricing of audit services.  Intuitively, higher quality 
audits might be expected to cost more so research has examined whether industry 
specialization is associated with higher audit fees.  Initial evidence that this was the case was 
reported by Craswell et al. (1995) but more recent research has questioned whether this is 
still the case after the mergers that created first the Big 6 and then the Big 5 (Ferguson and 
Stokes, 2002).  However, industry specialization may be a city-specific phenomena rather 
than a national phenomena as reported by Ferguson et al. (2003) and Francis et al. (2005).  
Research by Casterella et al. (2004) consider whether the development of a competitive 
strategy along the lines suggested by Porter (1985) leads to higher fees for industry 
specialization and find that price premiums do exist but only for smaller clients having low 
bargaining power.
2 
  The fact that industry specialists can earn higher audit fees suggests that industry 
specialists may deliver higher audit quality.  Earlier research by O’Keefe et al. (1994) reports 
that industry specialisation is associated with fewer violations of GAAS reporting standards. 
Wright and Wright (1997) confirm that industry specialists possess superior ability to 
generate alternative hypotheses when trying to identify accounting errors.  Solomon et al. 
(1999) examine the knowledge of industry specialists and find that they have more insight 
into non-error explanations for unexpected ratio fluctuations in analytical procedures.   
Owhoso et al. (2002) show that auditors working within their industry specialisation are more 
effective at detecting errors in staff working papers during the audit review process.  Balsam 
et al. (2003) and Krishnan (2003) report evidence that auditors who are industry specialists 
                                                 
2 Hay and Knechel (2006) also observe that the deregulation of advertising in New Zealand, as distinct from the 
deregulation of direct solicitation, led to increased Big 6 premiums as large firms used advertising to build the 
value of their brand name. 
6 are associated with lower levels of earnings management.  Furthermore, the incidence of 
fraud is lower (Carcello and Nagy, 2004), and the quality of corporate disclosure is better 
(Dunn and Mayhew, 2004) when a client’s auditor is an industry specialist. 
Research on the merits of auditor industry-specific experience suggests that auditors 
develop more extensive knowledge of the industry in which they specialize. Krishnan (2003) 
conjectures that specialist auditors are likely to develop databases detailing industry-specific 
best practices, industry-specific risks and errors, and unusual transactions, all of which can 
serve to enhance overall audit effectiveness.  In line with this reasoning, the results of a study 
by Low (2004) suggest that industry-specialist auditors are likely to better recognize the audit 
risks associated with an engagement in that specific industry.  Low (2004) further argues that 
this might be attributable to the fact that the enhanced knowledge of a client’s industry 
enables auditors to benchmark the client performance against the industry.  Since such 
knowledge is likely to be very useful for assessing the future viability of a client, industry 
specialists may reasonably be expected to make a more accurate assessment of the likelihood 
that a client will go bankrupt, leading to our first hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS H1:  Ceteris paribus, the likelihood that an audit opinion is not modified 
for going concern reasons for a client that goes bankrupt within the next 12 months is 
lower for industry specialist auditors. 
 
Audit methodology and reporting accuracy 
As previously mentioned, there has been a significant evolution in the audit 
methodologies of large accounting firms during the last decade. The new audit approaches, 
often referred to as business risk auditing, are based on a top-down, holistic perspective pf the 
client and encourage the auditor to develop a thorough understanding of a client’s business 
and related business risks (Bell et al., 1997; Lemon et al., 2000; Bell et al., 2005; Knechel et 
al., 2006).  The business risk approach forces an auditor to determine the extent to which the 
7 client’s strategic objectives are being met (or not) and to assess the likelihood that the client 
will succeed in the future.  
Several recent studies indicate that under certain conditions the business risk audit 
methodology may lead to greater audit effectiveness and efficiency (Kopp and O’Donnell, 
2005; Choy and King, 2005; Erickson and Mayhew, 2000; Lemon et al., 2000). More 
specifically, Lemon et al. (2000) investigate the evolution of audit methodologies applied by 
large accounting firms and find that many firms had undertaken a fundamental review of how 
problems arose in audit engagements.  These firms stated that perceived audit failures are 
generally not caused by the ineffectiveness of audit procedures in detecting misstatements, 
but are the result of difficulties arising from other aspects of the business context (e.g., the 
impact of rapidly changing business environments, globalization and technological advances 
on the client’s business).  Based on this finding, we argue that a thorough analysis of the 
client’s business could potentially decrease the likelihood of audit reporting errors because it 
may enhance auditors’ ability to recognize going concern problems. In addition, Knechel 
(2002) supports this view and argues that going concern evaluations would greatly benefit 
from a broad examination of risk and risk management, as embedded in the business risk 
auditing methodology.  This leads to our second hypothesis:
3  
HYPOTHESIS H2: Ceteris paribus, the likelihood that an audit opinion is not modified 
for going concern reasons for a client that subsequently goes bankrupt within the next 
12 months is lower for BRA auditors. 
 
Industry specialisation, strategic information and reporting accuracy 
                                                 
3 Other research suggests some problems with business risk audits.  Ballou et al. (2004) and O’Donnell and 
Schultz (2005) argue that the performance of a strategic analysis may hinder professional scepticism.   
Specifically, Ballou et al. (2004) report small problems in business processes are under-weighted when the 
client’s strategic positioning indicates that it is lagging behind industry norms.  Furthermore, O’Donnell and 
Schultz (2005) find that auditors that assess client strategic risk to be favourable are less likely to adjust risk 
assessments for inconsistent fluctuations in accounts. While both these studies suggest a potential reduction in 
audit quality, the direct effect of the evidence is at the level of the risk of material misstatement of accounts, not 
the overall level of client viability.  If these problems also extend to the assessment of going concern problems, 
than business risk auditing may lead to a reduction in the quality of auditor reporting.  
8 Industry specialists are likely to possess a high level of knowledge of a client’s 
industry and are likely to be better able to benchmark a client’s financial performance against 
industry norms.   Furthermore, industry specialist auditors are likely to develop databases 
detailing industry-specific best practices (Krishnan, 2003), allowing them to evaluate 
management’s strategic and operating initiatives against best practices in the industry as well 
as industry trends and market needs.  Based on this knowledge, industry specialists are also 
likely to have a better understanding of the external risks that might threaten the achievement 
of the company’s strategic objectives and be able to judge whether the client’s strategy has 
appropriately addressed external forces in the industry such as lifestyle trends, new entrants, 
regulation, technology, etc.  In this respect, Biggs, Selfridge and Krupka (1993) argue that 
knowledge of the client’s operations and industry and events in the client’s environment is 
critical to understanding the causes of financial distress and evaluating management’s plans 
to mitigate financial problems.  Since many companies respond to signs of financial distress 
by undertaking new strategic or operating initiatives, the ability to judge the eventual success 
(or failure) of such initiatives is important to the assessment of going concern risk.  An 
industry expert has a knowledge base on which to evaluate strategic and operating initiatives 
in response to financial distress, leading to our third hypothesis:  
HYPOTHESIS H3: Ceteris paribus, industry specialists are more likely to interpret 
non-financial strategic information correctly so the likelihood that an audit opinion is 
not modified for going concern reasons for a client that subsequently goes bankrupt 
within the next 12 months is lower.  
 
Audit methodology, strategic information and reporting accuracy  
Under the business risk methodology, risk assessment typically starts with a strategic 
analysis of the client.  This assessment comprises an analysis of the industry within which the 
client is operating, the client’s strategy to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage, the 
business risks that threaten the success of this strategy, and the client’s responses to these 
risks.  As such, the auditor gains a thorough understanding of the adequacy and feasibility of 
9 the company’s strategy in light of the external business environment and client internal 
processes and resources (Bell et al., 1997).  If the auditor obtains a complete and accurate 
understanding of the dynamics of the client’s business and industry, the auditor’s knowledge 
base should be particularly helpful for evaluating the going concern risk of a client (Knechel 
et al., 2006).   In the situation where a client undertakes specific strategic or operating 
initiatives in response to a going concern problem, an auditor using a business risk 
methodology may be particularly well placed to evaluate the likelihood that those plans will 
succeed or fail, leading to our fourth hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS H4:  Ceteris paribus, business risk auditors are more likely to interpret 
non-financial strategic information correctly, and therefore the likelihood that an 
audit opinion is not modified for a client that subsequently goes bankrupt within the 
next 12 months is lower.  
 
 
III. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND VARIABLE MEASUREMENT 
Basic Regression Models and Dependent Variable 
We examine the above hypotheses by developing a regression model to predict if an 
auditor issues a going concern opinion for companies that are financially distressed and 
eventually go bankrupt.  We conduct our analyses in three stages.  First, we estimate a base 
model of reporting accuracy that only contains financial variables shown by prior research to 
be associated with the likelihood of an auditor issuing a going concern report.  These 
variables serve as control variables in subsequent analysis:  
NO_GCO = f (control  variables)            (1) 
where NO_GCO is equal to 1 if the auditor does not issue a going concern opinion (i.e., an 
audit reporting “error”), zero otherwise.  The results of this model are reported as Model 1 in 
our results section.  Second, we examine the effect of industry specialists and auditors who 
use a business risk audit methodology on the likelihood of issuing a going concern report.   
NO_GCO  =  f (control variables, auditor type  variables)       (2) 
10 We report the results of this model as Models 2 through 5 in our results section.  Finally, we 
examine the interaction between different types of auditors and client initiatives in the face of 
financial distress.    
NO_GCO = f (control variables, auditor type variables, client action variables       
                        auditor type variables*client action variables)         (3) 
 
We report the results of this model as Models 6, 7 and 8 in our results section.   
Test Variables: Type of Auditor 
We consider three different classification schemes for identifying audit firms that may 
be considered high quality.  In our subsequent analysis, each category of auditor is tested 
individually. The first type of auditor we consider is based on the traditional definition of a 
high quality auditor, that is, Big N (8/6/5) firms.  Consequently, we define BIG5 as equal to 
one if the auditor is a Big N firm, zero otherwise.   
Second, we consider industry specialization as a source of audit quality.  Prior 
research has used various measures of industry specialisation. Most of these measures are 
based on audit firm market share within a particular industry (e.g., Krishnan, 2003; Craswell 
et al., 1995; Chen et al., 2005; Ferguson and Stokes, 2002; Casterella et al., 2004).  The 
underlying reasoning is that firms with the largest market shares will develop a knowledge 
base within a particular industry and will make significant investments in developing 
industry-specific audit technologies (Neal and Riley, 2004). We classify auditors as industry 
specialists if they have a within-industry market-share of at least 25 percent.  Prior to the 
consolidation of the Big 8 into the Big 6 in 1989, the auditor specialisation literature 
designated auditors as industry-specialists if they audited more than 10 percent of firms in the 
industry (e.g., Palmrose, 1984; Defond, 1992; Craswell et al., 1995). After the consolidation, 
most auditor specialisation studies used a specialisation measure of 20 percent market share 
(e.g., Casterella et al., 2004: Chen et al., 2005; Neal and Riley, 2004; Dunn and Mayhew, 
2004).   
11 Because the data of this study is drawn from the years 1998-2001, with all 
observations after the 1998 PricewaterhouseCoopers merger, a more restrictive specialisation 
measure seems appropriate.  The auditor's industry share is computed based on the square 
root of client sales within each two-digit SIC code using all companies available in 
Compustat for the period 1998-2001 (both Big 5 and non-Big 5 clients).  We define 
SPECIALIST as equal to one if the company is audited by a Big N auditor with at least 25 
percent market share in the industry, and zero otherwise.
4 Tables 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d 
summarize the Big 5 industry market shares for the 18 industries used in the study.   
Consistent with Francis et al. (2005), PricewaterhouseCoopers is the industry leader in more 
than half of the industries.  Averaged across all years, PricewaterhouseCoopers is the national 
leader in 12 industries, Ernst & Young in 2.5 industries, Deloitte & Touche in two industries, 
and Arthur Andersen and KPMG are both the national leader in one industry. 
<<<<<   Insert Tables 1a, 1b, 1c and 1d about here   >>>>> 
Finally, we consider if a business risk auditor is associated with more accurate audit 
reports.  Lemon, Tatum and Turley (2000) report substantial differences between audit firms 
regarding the implementation of business risk audit methodologies. Due to confidentiality 
agreements, they were unable to report the nature and extent of these variations.  In a 
subsequent paper, however, Curtis and Turley (2005), provide more details about the 
diversity in the approaches of the Big 5 firms.  Based on a series of practitioner interviews, 
they conclude that two of the firms adopted the business risk methodology to a greater extent 
than the other three.  Issues that separated the two groups of firms involved the scope of 
business risks to be addressed, how such risks should be linked to the financial statements, 
                                                 
4 Using a cut-off of 25%, Knechel, Naiker and Pacheco (2006) report that firms switching from non-specialist 
Big 4 firms to specialist Big 4 firms have a 3-day cumulative abnormal return of 2.5% while firms switching 
from a specialist Big 4 firm to a non-specialist Big 4 firm suffer a 3-day cumulative abnormal loss of -3.5%.  
They interpret this evidence as suggesting that the market considers audit firms with an industry market share of 
25% to be higher quality auditors. 
12 the appropriateness of relying on high level controls, and the concept and implications of 
‘significant risks’. In this study, we proxy for the differences between Big 5 audit firms with 
regard to the adoption of the business risk methodology by including a dummy variable, 
BRA, which is coded 1 if the company is audited by one of the two Big 5 firms that 
implemented the business risk audit methodology to a great extent, and 0 otherwise. 
Test Variables: Client Strategic and Operating Initiatives 
To test whether certain types of auditors perform better when confronted with non-
financial information such as strategic and operating changes by a client, we include two 
variables to represent possible client reaction to financial distress, one for strategic actions 
and one for operating actions that were implemented during the year under audit.  This 
categorization is based on research in corporate strategy, where the distinction between a 
strategic and operating turnaround approach was first introduced by Hofer (1980).
5  
Operating initiatives aim at a short-term improvement in financial performance through cost-
cutting, asset disposal, increased marketing efforts and upgrading existing products and 
processes, whereas strategic initiatives aim at long-term profitability by solving external, 
strategic problems, e.g., entering into a strategic alliance or cooperative agreements.  We only 
consider strategic initiatives which are likely to have a short term positive cash flow impact 
since the auditor’s decision about issuing a going concern report only considers the next 12 
months of a client’s performance.
6  Prior research has found that some operating initiatives 
lead to an increased likelihood of issuing a going concern opinion (Behn et al. 2001; Geiger 
and Rama, 2003; Bruynseels and Willekens, 2006), while strategic initiatives are associated 
with a reduced likelihood of receiving a going concern opinion (Bruynseels and Willekens, 
2006).   
                                                 
5 For other strategy studies that adopt a similar classification, see also Robbins and Pearce II, 1992; Barker and 
Duhaime, 1997; Sudarsanam and Lai, 2001; Bruton et al. 2003. 
6 In the strategy literature other strategic initiatives have been defined that may have a long-term impact, such as 
acquisitions and new product introductions.  
13 The information regarding client operating and strategic initiatives was manually 
collected from the relevant 10-Ks filed with the SEC.  Based on the analysis of the 10-Ks, we 
define OPERATING as a scaled discrete variable reflecting the number of operating 
initiatives implemented by the company during the year under audit.  Specifically, we 
assessed whether the company engaged in: (1) cost-cutting activities, (2) asset disposal, (3) 
upgrading existing products and processes or (4) increasing marketing efforts.  We then 
scored each company from 0 to 4 based on how many of these operating initiatives were 
undertaken during the year under audit. This score was then divided by the maximum score in 
the sample to scale it to a range of 0 to 1.  With respect to strategic initiatives, we assessed 
whether the company entered into strategic alliances or cooperative agreements with other 
firms.   We define STRATEGIC as equal to 1 if the company took such actions and 0 
otherwise.   In our testing below, we also consider the interaction of OPERATING and 
STRATEGIC with the various types of auditors to evaluate whether different types of 
auditors process this information differently.   
Control Variables  
Extensive prior research provides a rich set of potential control variables that may be 
associated with the likelihood that an auditor issues a going concern opinion (McKeown et al. 
1991; Raghunandan and Rama 1995; Carcello et al., 1995; Geiger and Raghunandan 2001; 
Gaeremynck and Willekens, 2003; Knechel and Vanstraelen, 2004).  We include the 
following control variables to capture the underlying condition of the firm:  
LNSALES  A measure of size, i.e., natural log of net sales. 
 
ZSCORE  A measure of financial distress based on the Z-score developed by 
Zmijewski (1984). 
 
DEFAULT  Dummy variable with a value of one if a company is in either payment 
default or technical default of loan covenants. 
 
SQBNKLAG The square root of days from the date of the audit report to the 
bankruptcy date.  
14  
RAISE$  Prior audit opinion research has identified money-raising activities as a 
factor that may mitigate against issuing a going concern opinion (Behn 
et al., 2001; Geiger and Rama, 2003). We construct our variable by 
assessing whether the client plans to (1) borrow funds through existing 
bank lines of credit or debt instruments and/or (2) issue equity through 
existing arrangements. The raw coding of these money-raising 
activities yields values of 0, 1 or 2, which is then scaled by the 
maximum score in the sample so as to fall in the range 0 to 1.  
 
LNSALES and the data necessary to calculate ZSCORE were collected from the 
WORLDSCOPE database.  SQBNKLAG and DEFAULT were derived from 
WORLDSCOPE database in conjunction with the company’s 10-K. The information 
regarding client initiatives to raise money was manually collected from the relevant 10-K.  A 
summary of all test and control variables is presented in Table 2. 
<<<<<   Insert Table 2 about here   >>>>> 
 
 IV. SAMPLE AND UNIVARIATE TESTS 
Sample selection 
Because the purpose of this study is to shed some light on reasons an auditor does not 
issue a going concern report when a client subsequently goes bankrupt, our sample consists 
only of bankrupt companies.  To start, we obtained a list of US public company bankruptcies 
for the years 1999 through 2002 by searching the Wall Street Journal Index and several other 
web-based resources
7 under the heading “chapter 11” for those years.  We restricted our 
sample to companies in manufacturing industries (SIC 20 to 39) to eliminate industry effects.  
This resulted in a sample of 127 manufacturing companies that went bankrupt in the period 
1999 to 2002.  Consistent with prior research, we also required that the company had 
received an audit opinion within the 12 months prior to bankruptcy (e.g., McKeown et al. 
1991; Mutchler et al. 1997; Geiger and Raghunandan 2001).  Furthermore, following 
                                                 
7 www.defaultrisk.com, www. BankruptcyData.com 
15 Hopwood et al. (1994), we restricted the analysis to companies that exhibited at least two 
financial distress criteria.
8  These requirements resulted in a sample of 102 companies: 14 
from 1998, 16 from 1999, 45 from 2000, and 27 from 2001.  One observation was 
subsequently identified as an outlier and removed from the sample, yielding a final sample of 
101 firm observations as described in Table 3. 
<<<<<   Insert Table 3 about here   >>>>> 
Descriptive statistics and univariate results  
Table 4 contains the descriptive statistics for the full sample of bankrupt companies, 
whereas Table 5 compares the descriptive statistics of the companies that went bankrupt and 
received a going concern opinion to those that did not receive a going concern opinion.  
Table 4 indicates that 26 percent of the companies in the sample are audited by a business 
risk auditor, and 31 percent of the companies are audited by a specialist auditor.  Only 4 
percent of the sample is audited by a specialist auditor who also uses the business risk 
methodology.  
<<<<<   Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here   >>>>> 
Table 5 reports the results of a t-test of differences between firms receiving going 
concern reports and those not receiving going concern reports.  Companies that did NOT 
receive a going concern report (arguably an auditor reporting “error”) are larger (LNSALES, 
p<.01), are less likely to be in default (DEFAULT, p<.01), experience less financial distress 
(ZSCORE, p<.01), have a longer bankruptcy lag (SQBNKLAG, p<.01), and are more likely 
to disclose plans to raise money through additional borrowings or the issuance of stock 
(RAISE$, p<.01). Of most interest, the univariate comparisons indicate that the variables 
                                                 
8 The financial distress criteria were specified as follows (see also, Chen and Church, 1992):  1) negative 
retained earnings, 2) negative operating income, 3) negative net income, 4) negative working capital, 5) negative 
net worth, and 6) negative operating cash flows. 
16 representing strategic and operating initiatives do not differ between the two groups, nor do 




The results of the multivariate logistic analysis of auditor reporting ‘errors’ (i.e., not 
issuing a going concern opinion to companies that subsequently go bankrupt) are presented in 
Tables 6 and 7.  In Table 6, we present the results of five regression models that we use to 
test hypotheses 1 and 2.  Specifically, Model 1 provides the benchmark model without any of 
the test variables.  The model has good explanatory power with a chi-square statistic of 67.61 
and a McFadden R
2 of 0.49.  Consistent with prior research, the results indicate that an 
auditor is more likely to incur a reporting “error” when the company is larger (LNSALES, 
p<0.007), has a lower probability of bankruptcy (ZSCORE, p<0.001), is not in default 
(DEFAULT, p<0.008), has a longer bankruptcy lag (SQBNKLAG, p<0.002) and has plans to 
raise money (RAISE$, p<0.002).   
<<<<<   Insert Table 6 about here   >>>>> 
Next, Models 2 through 5 include our individual measures of auditor type: BIG5, 
SPECIALIST and BRA.  Model 2 indicates that the likelihood of an auditor issuing a going 
concern opinion is not associated with whether the auditor is a Big 5 firm or not (p<.5185).  
Model 3 provides a test of our first hypothesis.  The McFadden R
2 is 0.49 for this model.  
Since SPECIALIST is not significantly associated with the likelihood of a going concern 
report (p<.9353), the results do not support H1.  Model 4 provides a test of our second 
hypothesis.  The McFadden R
2  is 0.51 for this model.  BRA is significant and positive 
(p<.098), which is counter to our expectations because it indicates that a firm using a 
business risk methodology are less likely to issue a going concern report for a firm that 
subsequently goes bankrupt (i.e., more likely to issue an “erroneous” report).  Thus, H2 is 
17 also not supported by the results.  Model 5 indicates that this result is also observed if audit 
firms are classified by both industry specialization and business risk methodology, i.e., BRA 
continues to be positive and significant (p<.0436).    
Also, it is interesting to note that regardless of the specification of the type of auditor, 
RAISE$ is significant and positive in all models.  This suggests that a client that appears able 
to raise cash in the short term is not likely to receive a going concern opinion no matter what 
type of auditor is conducting the engagement.  This suggests that auditors are ‘fooled’ into 
not issuing a going concern opinion by this type of information.  Note that this result also 
persists in subsequent tests (see Models 6, 7 and 8). 
The results in Table 6 do not indicate whether auditors, particularly auditors using a 
business risk methodology, are influenced by the operating and strategic initiatives that a 
client may undertake.   These tests are reported in Table 7.  Model 6 tests the interaction 
between client actions and Big 5 auditors, Model 7 tests the interaction between client actions 
and specialists, and Model 8 tests the interaction between client actions and business risk 
auditors.  The latter two models provide tests of hypotheses 3 and 4.   However, it is 
interesting to note that RAISE$ continues to be positive and significant in all models, 
suggesting that auditors place a lot of credence—possibly undeserved—on the ability of a 
company to raise cash as a mitigating factor against issuing a going concern opinion 
regardless of the type of auditor. 
<<<<<   Insert Table 7 about here   >>>>> 
  In Model 6, we examine how Big 5 auditors are affected by the operating and 
strategic initiatives of a client in financial distress.  The McFadden R
2 for the model is 0.53.  
Consistent with Model 2, BIG5 is not significant, nor is either measure of client initiatives 
(OPERATING, STRATEGIC) or the interaction of BIG5 with client initiatives.  In short, we 
find no evidence that the likelihood of a Big 5 auditor issuing a going concern opinion for a 
18 company that subsequently goes bankrupt is influenced by a client’s operating or strategic 
actions.  
In Model 7, we examine how industry specialists are affected by a client’s operating 
and strategic initiatives.  The McFadden R
2 for the model is 0.56.  In this case, we see that the 
presence of client operating and strategic initiatives both increase the likelihood that an 
auditor will not issue a going concern opinion even though the company subsequently goes 
bankrupt (OPERATING, 4.01, p<.0293; STRATEGIC, 1.48 p<.0665).  For auditor type, we 
see that the results are different from Model 3: SPECIALIST is now significant and positive 
(4.06, p<.0746).  However, since one of the interactions involving SPECIALIST is also 
significant, the main effect can not be interpreted in isolation.   Specifically, 
OPERATING*SPECIALIST is significant and negative (-6.35, p<.0775).  Since the 
coefficient of the interaction exceeds the coefficient of SPECIALIST, the net effect is 
negative (p<.05).  Taken together, these results suggest that non-specialist auditors are 
“fooled” into not giving a going concern opinion by operating and strategic initiatives of the 
client, while auditors that are specialists are not “fooled” by operating initiatives.  However, 
this industry expertise does not seem to protect specialist auditors against misinterpreting the 
strategic initiatives any better than non-specialists (i.e., STRATEGIC*AUDITOR is not 
significant). 
In Model 8, we examine how auditors who use a business risk methodology are 
affected by a client’s operating and strategic initiatives.  The McFadden R
2 for the model is 
0.56.  Interestingly, the insignificance of the main effects for OPERATING (p<.945) and 
STRATEGIC (p<.7567) suggests that non-BRA auditors do not react to the presence of client 
initiatives in general.
9  Nor do the BRA auditors react to the presence of strategic initiatives 
                                                 
9 Since BRA is a dummy variable, the coefficients on the main effects can be interpreted as the effect of those 
variables on non-BRA auditors (BRA = 0).  The effect on BRA auditors is then captured by the interaction 
terms when BRA = 1. 
19 (STRATEGIC*BRA, p<.542).  However, BRA auditors are less likely to issue a going 
concern opinion to a client that subsequently goes bankrupt if the client has undertaken 
operating initiatives (OPERATING*BRA, 5.76, p<.088).  This results does suggest that 
business risk auditors may be “fooled” by short term operating efforts that appear to reduce 
financial distress. One possible interpretation of this result is that the analysis of client 
strategic viability per se may not be beneficial to auditor reporting accuracy.  In other words, 
auditors may benefit only from client strategic analysis if they have adequate industry 
experience to also judge the adequacy of client strategic and operating initiatives. 
Note that we also tested the interactions (not reported) between RAISE$*AUDITOR. 
These were not significant in any of the specifications of AUDITOR.  This suggests that high 
quality auditors, regardless of the specification as Big 5, industry specialist or business risk 
auditors, do not do a better job in interpreting financial information related to raising future 
cash.  These findings are particularly interesting when linked to our results above regarding 
specialists, as this indicates that specialist auditors differentiate themselves from non-
specialists in how they interpret operating initiatives to reduce financial distress, but are not 
able to do so in interpreting financial information related to raising future cash.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we examine the impact of various auditor type variables (i.e. big 5, audit 
auditor industry specialization and audit methodology) on going concern reporting accuracy.  
More specifically, we investigate whether enhanced industry knowledge or an increased 
focus on business risk auditing methodologies affect the auditor’s ability to identify failing 
companies.  Additionally, we test whether these auditor characteristics are valuable in 
evaluating management initiatives to reduce financial distress.  Using a sample of US 
companies from manufacturing industries (SIC 20-39) that went bankrupt between 1998-
2001, we do not find evidence supporting that specialist auditors are more likely to issue a 
20 going concern opinion for companies that subsequently go bankrupt.  However, our evidence 
does indicate that non-specialist auditors are ‘fooled’ into not giving a going concern opinion 
by operating and strategic management initiatives undertaken by distressed clients, while 
auditors that are specialists are not fooled by operating initiatives.  This evidence is consistent 
with higher audit quality provided by specialist auditors. 
Interestingly and counter to our expectations, we find that audit firms using a business 
risk methodology are less likely to issue a going–concern opinion for a firm that subsequently 
goes bankrupt.  We also find that non-business risk auditors do not react to the presence of 
client initiatives to reduce financial distress.  However, business risk auditors are less likely 
to issue a going concern opinion to a client that subsequently goes bankrupt if the client has 
undertaken operating initiatives, such as cost cutting.  This suggests that business risk 
auditors may be ‘fooled’ by short term operating efforts to reduce financial distress.  Finally, 
we also find very strong evidence that auditors, irrespective of their type, are ‘fooled’ into not 
issuing a going concern opinion for clients that subsequently go bankrupt when the client is 
planning on raising cash in the short term.  Linked to our results above, it seems that 
specialist auditors seem to do a better job in interpreting operating initiatives to reduce 
financial distress, but are not doing a better job in interpreting financial information related to 
raising future cash.  
Overall, we find that specialist auditors per se do not have a beneficial impact on 
reporting accuracy but that audits performed by BRA auditors lead to lower (not higher) 
auditor reporting accuracy. A further refinement of the analysis indicates that the likelihood 
of reporting errors is higher when a client implements operating initiatives, except when the 
client is audited by an industry specialist, in which case the likelihood of reporting errors is 
lower.  The results further also indicate that the likelihood of reporting errors is higher for a 
client that implements operating initiatives if the auditor adopts the business risk 
21 methodology. Taken together the results suggest the possibility that an analysis of client 
strategic and operating initiatives may not be beneficial to audit quality, unless auditors have 
adequate industry experience to judge the adequacy of those initiatives.  
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27 TABLE 1A: BIG 5 AUDITOR MARKET SHARES FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES FOR 1998  
    Industry Market Shares 
Two-Digit SIC  Industry  AA  EY  DT  KPMG  PW 
20  Food and Kindred Products  0.12 0.15  0.13  0.20 0.34 
22  Textile Mill Products  0.16 0.36  0.17  0.12 0.10 
23  Apparel and Other Textile Products  0.20 0.25  0.21  0.03 0.16 
24  Lumber and Wood Products  0.34 0.05  0.11  0.08 0.36 
25 Furniture  and  Fixtures  0.24 0.09  0.08  0.13 0.36 
26  Paper and Allied Products  0.22 0.14  0.15  0.13 0.28 
27  Printing and Publishing  0.12 0.19  0.21  0.18 0.24 
28  Chemicals and Allied Products  0.13 0.13  0.17  0.15 0.32 
30  Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic 
Products  0.20 0.22  0.10  0.09 0.33 
31  Leather and Leather Products  0.00 0.30  0.13  0.21 0.21 
32  Stone, Clay and Glass Products  0.26 0.22  0.15  0.10 0.21 
33 Primary  Metal  Industries  0.13 0.24  0.13  0.03 0.41 
34  Fabricated Metal Products  0.19 0.22  0.07  0.13 0.34 
35  Industrial Machinery and Equipment  0.15 0.19  0.11  0.13 0.33 
36  Electronic and Other Equipment  0.12 0.21  0.13  0.25 0.22 
37 Transportation  Equipment  0.11 0.18  0.23  0.12 0.31 
38  Instruments and Related Products  0.15 0.22  0.12  0.11 0.32 
39 Miscellaneous  Manufacturing  0.12 0.15  0.27  0.13 0.21 
          




TABLE 1B: BIG 5 AUDITOR MARKET SHARES FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES FOR 1999  
    Industry Market Shares 
Two-Digit SIC  Industry  AA  EY  DT  KPMG  PWC 
20  Food and Kindred Products  0.12 0.14  0.14  0.19 0.35 
22  Textile Mill Products  0.15 0.37  0.16  0.13 0.11 
23  Apparel and Other Textile Products  0.19 0.22  0.28  0.04 0.14 
24  Lumber and Wood Products  0.33 0.10  0.13  0.09 0.31 
25 Furniture  and  Fixtures  0.25 0.10  0.09  0.14 0.32 
26  Paper and Allied Products  0.22 0.16  0.14  0.12 0.28 
27  Printing and Publishing  0.13 0.22  0.16  0.20 0.23 
28  Chemicals and Allied Products  0.14 0.13  0.17  0.15 0.32 
30  Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic 
Products 0.21  0.22  0.08  0.08  0.34 
31  Leather and Leather Products  0.06 0.28  0.12  0.19 0.20 
32  Stone, Clay and Glass Products  0.26 0.20  0.22  0.07 0.18 
33 Primary  Metal  Industries  0.12 0.27  0.15  0.05 0.38 
34  Fabricated Metal Products  0.19 0.21  0.08  0.11 0.34 
35  Industrial Machinery and Equipment  0.15 0.18  0.12  0.16 0.33 
36  Electronic and Other Equipment  0.11 0.19  0.13  0.26 0.25 
37 Transportation  Equipment  0.11 0.21  0.23  0.11 0.31 
38  Instruments and Related Products  0.16 0.22  0.10  0.10 0.33 
39 Miscellaneous  Manufacturing  0.11 0.15  0.26  0.13 0.19 
          




28 TABLE 1C: BIG 5 AUDITOR MARKET SHARES FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES FOR 2000  
 
    Industry Market Shares 
Two-Digit SIC  Industry  AA  EY  DT  KPMG  PWC 
20  Food and Kindred Products  0.12 0.14  0.10  0.22 0.37 
22  Textile Mill Products  0.13 0.40  0.16  0.15 0.07 
23  Apparel and Other Textile Products  0.19 0.25  0.25  0.04 0.14 
24  Lumber and Wood Products  0.35 0.11  0.12  0.10 0.29 
25 Furniture  and  Fixtures  0.26 0.08  0.09  0.11 0.33 
26  Paper and Allied Products  0.14 0.20  0.16  0.16 0.29 
27  Printing and Publishing  0.15 0.20  0.16  0.21 0.23 
28  Chemicals and Allied Products  0.14 0.16  0.17  0.19 0.27 
30  Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic 
Products 0.18  0.21  0.11  0.13  0.30 
31  Leather and Leather Products  0.06 0.27  0.13  0.19 0.21 
32  Stone, Clay and Glass Products  0.27 0.22  0.25  0.10 0.09 
33 Primary  Metal  Industries  0.12 0.24  0.13  0.03 0.45 
34  Fabricated Metal Products  0.17 0.19  0.07  0.13 0.36 
35  Industrial Machinery and Equipment  0.15 0.23  0.12  0.15 0.29 
36  Electronic and Other Equipment  0.10 0.19  0.12  0.26 0.26 
37 Transportation  Equipment  0.13 0.20  0.25  0.11 0.29 
38  Instruments and Related Products  0.14 0.24  0.09  0.11 0.35 
39 Miscellaneous  Manufacturing  0.13 0.11  0.24  0.10 0.20 
          




TABLE 1D: BIG 5 AUDITOR MARKET SHARES FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES FOR 2001  
 
    Industry Market Shares 
Two-Digit SIC  Industry  AA  EY  DT  KPMG  PWC 
20  Food and Kindred Products  0.10 0.17  0.11  0.23 0.34 
22  Textile Mill Products  0.10 0.44  0.09  0.18 0.08 
23  Apparel and Other Textile Products  0.18 0.23  0.24  0.04 0.19 
24  Lumber and Wood Products  0.32 0.13  0.12  0.07 0.32 
25 Furniture  and  Fixtures  0.22 0.12  0.08  0.12 0.34 
26  Paper and Allied Products  0.16 0.21  0.12  0.15 0.32 
27  Printing and Publishing  0.14 0.22  0.14  0.21 0.23 
28  Chemicals and Allied Products  0.14 0.14  0.16  0.16 0.32 
30  Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic 
Products  0.18 0.22  0.16  0.11 0.26 
31  Leather and Leather Products  0.06 0.29  0.13  0.20 0.19 
32  Stone, Clay and Glass Products  0.25 0.23  0.22  0.10 0.13 
33 Primary  Metal  Industries  0.12 0.21  0.15  0.03 0.44 
34  Fabricated Metal Products  0.17 0.22  0.08  0.11 0.36 
35  Industrial Machinery and Equipment  0.14 0.27  0.11  0.14 0.29 
36  Electronic and Other Equipment  0.11 0.20  0.11  0.25 0.25 
37 Transportation  Equipment  0.09 0.21  0.24  0.11 0.31 
38  Instruments and Related Products  0.13 0.24  0.11  0.10 0.35 
39 Miscellaneous  Manufacturing  0.17 0.12  0.22  0.13 0.19 
          
AA: Arthur Andersen; EY: Ernst & Young; DL: Deloitte & Touche; KPMG: Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler and PWC: 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 
29 TABLE 2: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND EXPECTED SIGNS 
Variable  Definition  Expected 
sign 
Dependent variable    
    NO_GCO   1 if no going concern report was issued for a company that went 
bankrupt the subsequent year; 0 otherwise 
 
Independent variables    
  
Auditor Size 





1 if the  auditor is a Big 5 auditor 
 
     BRA  1 if the company is audited by a Big 5 auditor who adopted the 
business risk methodology, 0 otherwise 
? 
  Auditor Specialisation     
SPECIALIST  1 if the company is audited by a Big  5 auditor who holds more 
than 25% market share (measured in square root of client net 
sales) in a two-digit industry, 0 otherwise 
+ 
  Non-financial variables    
OPERATING  A score from 0 to 4, scaled by its maximum value in the sample,  
representing the sum of all operating initiatives (marketing, asset 
disposal, upgrading of products and processes, cost-cutting) 
- 
    
STRATEGIC  Dummy variable which equals one if the company undertakes 
strategic initiatives with a short-term impact (cooperative 
agreements) 
? 
Money-raising activities    
    RAISE$  A score from 0 to 2, scaled by its maximum value in the sample, 
representing the sum of financial initiatives to raise money 
through the issuance of stock or additional borrowings  
+ 
  Control variables    
ZSCORE probability  of  bankruptcy,  calculated from the ZSCORE (1984) 
weighted probit bankruptcy prediction model 
- 
DEFAULT  1 if in payment default or technical default of loan covenants, 0 
otherwise 
- 
SQBNKLAG    the square root of the number of days from the audit report date 
to the date of bankruptcy 
+ 
LNSALES    natural log of net sales  ? 






  30             TABLE 3: SAMPLE OF BANKRUPT COMPANIES PER TWO DIGIT INDUSTRY GROUPING 
Two-digit 
SIC Code 
Industry name  Number of 
Companies 
20  Food and Kindred Products  5 
22  Textile Mill Products  7 
23  Apparel and Other Textile Products  4 
24  Lumber and Wood Products  1 
25 Furniture  and  Fixtures  1 
26  Paper and Allied Products  4 
27  Printing and Publishing  2 
28  Chemicals and Allied Products  11 
30  Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products  2 
31  Leather and Leather Products  1 
32  Stone, Clay and Glass Products  5 
33 Primary  Metal  Industries  6 
34  Fabricated Metal Products  2 
35  Industrial Machinery and Equipment  14 
36  Electronic and Other Equipment  14 
37 Transportation  Equipment  11 
38  Instruments and Related Products  7 
39 Miscellaneous  Manufacturing  4 
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  31TABLE 4: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
Variables  Mean  Median  St. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Dependent variable      
    NO_GCO  0.45 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Independent variables       
  Auditor type       
    BIG5  0.87 1.00 0.34 0.00 1.00 
    BRA  0.26 0.00 0.44 0.00 1.00 
    SPECIALIST  0.31 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 
  Operating approach       
OPERATING   0.51 0.50 0.24 0.00 1.00 
   Strategic  approach       
STRATEGIC  0.36 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
 Money-raising activities      
RAISE$  0.26 0.00 0.30 0.00 1.00 
  Control variables       
ZSCORE  -0.51 -1.28 3.25 -5.29 14.87 
DEFAULT  0.55 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
SQBNKLAG  13.95 15.00  3.85  4.36  19.08 
LNSALES   11.74 12.14  2.56  0.00  15.61 
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TABLE 5:   UNIVARIATE TESTS OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN REPORTING ERROR FIRMS AND NON-REPORTING 
ERROR FIRMS 
  Firms receiving GCO 
(NO_GCO=0) 
(n=56) 







    Variables  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  (t-statistic) 
        
  Auditor Type        
 BIG5  0.86 0.35 0.87 0.32  0.47 
 BRA  0.25 0.44 0.27 0.45  0.19 
 SPECIALIST  0.27 0.45 0.36 0.48  0.94 
        
Operating approach        
OPERATING   0.52 0.24 0.49 0.25  0.48 
        
  Strategic approach        
     STRATEGIC  0.30 0.46 0.42 0.50  1.23 
        
 Money-raising activities        
     RAISE$  0.14 0.26 0.41 0.29  4.87*** 
        
  Control variables        
ZSCORE  0.52 3.73 -1.79 1.87  4.05*** 
DEFAULT  0.71 0.46 0.36 0.48  3.82*** 
SQBNKLAG  12.51 4.07 15.74 2.67  4.80*** 
LNSALES   11.13 2.85 12.51 1.92  2.91*** 
        
 
*      indicates significance at the .10 level (two-tailed) 
**    indicates significance at the .05 level (two-tailed) 
***  indicates significance at the .01 level (two-tailed) 
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TABLE 6: LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS TESTING THE IMPACT OF AUDITOR TYPE ON TYPE II REPORTING ERRORS  
Variables    Model 1  Model 2    Model 3    Model 4  Model 5 
    coeff  χ 
2  p-value coeff  χ 
2  p-value   coeff  χ 
2  p-value    coeff  χ 
2  p-value  coeff  χ 
2  p-value 
                            
C       -11.73 13.02 0.0003   -11.95 13.08 0.0003 -11.71 12.83 0.0003   -13.05 13.61 0.0002 -13.25 13.74 0.0002 
LNSALES        0.57 7.23 0.0072 0.51 5.03 0.0250 0.57 6.81 0.0091   0.61 7.46 0.0063 0.61 7.10 0.0077 
ZSCORE        -0.62 11.15 0.0008 -0.62 11.06 0.0009 -0.62 11.01 0.0009   -0.65 10.49 0.0012 -0.68 10.27 0.0014 
DEFAULT        -1.75 6.97 0.0083 -1.75 6.99 0.0082 -1.75 6.89 0.0087   -2.16 8.46 0.0036 -2.25 8.98 0.0027 
SQBNKLAG        0.29 9.23 0.0024 0.31 9.15 0.0025 0.29 9.21 0.0024   0.33 9.97 0.0016 0.32 8.86 0.0029 
RAISE$        3.52 9.48 0.0021 3.68 9.75 0.0018 3.51 9.44 0.0021   3.75 9.61 0.0019 3.90 9.95 0.0016 
BIG5         0.73 0.41 0.5195      
SPECIALIST          0.06 0.01 0.9353   0.79 0.91 0.3402 
BRA            1.18 2.75 0.0975 1.62 4.07 0.0436 
SPECIALIST*BRA            -2.49 1.25 0.2627 
                    
McFadden R
2      0.49 0.49 0.49  0.51 0.52  
Model χ 
2     67.61 68.02 67.61  70.51 72.23  
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TABLE 7: LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS TESTING THE IMPACT OF AUDITOR TYPE AND CLIENT STRATEGIC ACTIONS ON TYPE II REPORTING ERRORS  
 
 
Variables    Model 6  Model 7    Model 8   
    AUDITOR = BIG 5  AUDITOR = SPECIALIST    AUDITOR = BRA   
    coeff  χ 
2  p-value  coeff  χ 
2  p-value    coeff  χ 
2  p-value   
                   
C   -14.11 10.63 0.0011   -17.43 16.49 0.0001    -15.88 13.79 0.0002  
LNSALES   0.56 5.28 0.0216 0.67 7.66 0.0056    0.70 7.90 0.0049  
ZSCORE   -0.76 11.35 0.0008 -0.74 12.54 0.0004    -0.73 11.24 0.0008  
DEFAULT   -2.02 7.35 0.0067 -2.06 7.15 0.0075    -2.09 6.77 0.0092  
SQBNKLAG   0.41 10.19 0.0014 0.43 12.42 0.0004    0.43 11.19 0.0008  
RAISE$   4.06 9.25 0.0024 3.57 8.44 0.0037    4.09 9.51 0.0020  
AUDITOR   -0.70 0.09 0.7637 4.06 3.18 0.0746    -2.59 1.49 0.2220  
OPERATING   0.37 0.01 0.9337 4.01 4.75 0.0293    -0.12 0.00 0.9455  
STRATEGIC   -0.79 0.14 0.7094 1.48 3.37 0.0665    0.30 0.10 0.7567  
OPERATING*AUDITOR   1.65 0.12 0.7249 -6.35 3.12 0.0775    5.76 2.90 0.0888  
STRATEGIC*AUDITOR   2.22 0.93 0.3340 -2.33 1.75 0.1854    0.93 0.37 0.5423  
                  
McFadden R
2     0.53 0.56     0.56
Model χ 
2     73.69 77.34    77.27
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